Italy is an ideai candidate for testing the credit view of the transmission mechanism because of a bank-centered financial structure, a sizable trade debt, and an economy tilted towards small firrns. An empirica! analysis of trade credit and debt on an averaged pane! shows that small firrns act as being financially constrained and cycle-sensitive, whereas large ones aim at smoothing sales, adopt an integrated management of inventories and receivables and have a higher trade debt to purchases elasticity. On balance, the net trade credit channel does not shield, as implied by the credit view, small firrns from a monetary squeeze.
l.

Introduction
Trade credit -credit extended by a seller who does not require immediate payment for delivery of a product -is under renewed scrutiny because some key results of the credi t view of the monetary transmission mechanism hinge on the trade-off between trade and bank credit taken by (mainly) small firms. According to the credit view, with banks unable to insulate the loans portfolio from the effects of a restrictive monetary policy through asset (via reducing securities) and/or liabilities management, the weak substitutability between bank lending and market funding introduces an additional channel in the IS-LM transmission mechanism through shocks to the Ioan supply that hit mostiy liquidity constrained smalVyoung firms (Bemanke-Blinder 1988) . A crosssection implication is that large firms should extend net trade credit à la Meltzer (1960) to smaller ones, thus at least partially thwarting a restrictive monetary policy. This theoretical point made in Kashyap et a/.(1993, 88) is backed by empirica! evidence showing, on aggregate data, that when extemal funds fall the share ofbank loans shrinks. Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) object though that the finding depends crucially on the definition of extemai funds as the sum of oniy two types of Iiabilities (bank lending and commerciai paper) and on a possible fallacy of composition effect, due to the different dependency of large and small firms on bank credit; in fact, including trade and long term market debt, they detect no monetary policy induced changes in extemal funds composition and, furthermore, in periods of monetary squeeze, an overall reallocation of funds from small to large firms.
These contrasting results o n US data cali for a closer examination of ho w interfirm credi t fits the credit view in other countries, that differ for the financial structure as well as for trade credit contractual clauses and relative importance as a financing means. On severa! grounds, Italy is an ideai candidate to this aim. First, key features of its financial structure suggest that a credit channei is very likely to work there: the modest development of the stock and private bond markets; the absence of a commerciai paper market; the high fragmentation and heterogeneity among credit institutions; the Iow degree of intemational credit market integration, partly deriving from the high fiscal and reserve burdens imposed on domestic banks; the high interest elasticity of money demand, which implies that monetary policy exerts a powerfui impact on the size of bank baiance sheets (Angeioni et al. , 1995) . Second, on the reai side, the industriai structure is heaviiy tiited towards small firms. Third, the size of trade credit is likely to be among the highest in the industriaiized countries. Though statistica! information is generally pretty poor, the most recent evidence brought for by the BIS (Kneeshaw, 1995) suggests that the US has, after Germany, one of l the lowest trade credit and debt to GDP ratios, with France and Japan at the opposite side; roughly the same ranking holds for the net trade credit ratio (T ab le l). Estimates inferred mainly from firm balance sheets suggest that the Italian case is even more extreme than the French experience (Marotta, 1992; Rajan-Zingales, 1994, 
Background literature
Most empirica! literature that includes trade credit among firm liabilities starts from the standard assumption of a cost hierarchy between trade and bank credit, implying that the former is taken only if the firm is credit rationed (Jaffee-Stiglitz, 1990 policy, as pointed out by Schwartz-Whitcomb (1979) and more recently elaborateci by Brennan et al. (1988) .
Brennan et al. 's paper shows that a cost comparison between trade and bank credit can be misleading if the isomorphism between a sale on credit and the bundling of a "good" and of a financial service is not acknowledged. Building on the assumptions of non competitive product markets, possibly in conjunction with adverse selection in the credit market, price discrimination between cash and credit customers is shown to be advantageous whenever the elasticity of demand of cash customers exceeds that of credit customers or whenever cash customers' reservation prices are systematically higher than those of credit customers. Unlike a pure intermediary, a non-financial finn can thus offset losses o n the o ne si de ( e.g. in trade credi t extension at cheaper terms than bank rates) with profits on the other side. In order to rationalize small firms extending trade credit to the large ones, the market power exploitation argument is therefore not necessarily required, though it may well be active (see, for an earlier result supporting the Galbraithian coercive hypothesis on UK data, Davis-Yeoman, 1974 ).
An earlier strand of literature stresses, with a straightforward application of the BaumolTobin framework for the transactions demand for money, that the use .of trade credit provides information on future cash needs by allowing buyers to accumulate invoices for payment, thus enabling them to predict their cash needs better (Ferris, 1981) . As a result, they are able to hold smaller cash balances and to incur lower brokerage costs than they would if they paid invoices immediately upon receipt. Sellers also benefit from trade credit, because it enables them to predict cash receipts more accurately and to reduce their precautionary cash balances as well. Though not fully spelled out, an implication of this approach is that, for given variability of sal es and purchases, large firms, with a superior financial management ability, should be better able than smaller ones at exploiting economies of scale.
The link between financial and transactions motives, both heavily influenced by the institutional context firms operate within, bears on the design of an empirica! investigation on trade 2. After the removal of credit ceilings in 1983, competition among banks for market shares resulted in a steady increase of the loans to total bank assets ratio (in tune with lower loan interest rates). A new equilibrium in asset composition was possibly reached after 1991, when the securities/assets ratio hit a historic low and there was a contraction in credit lines made available by banks to their clients; the positive credit supply shock implied however an excessive easing in the creditworthiness assessment of borrowers, as testified by mounting bad debts. Banks have gradually strengthened their control over the supply of credit, which has become more dependent on their fund-raising ability; a generalized increase in the speed of adjustment of lending rates to money market conditions has been the result (Angeloni et al., 1995) . (Table 2) . Consequently, despite of sizable changes in the vertical integration indicator, the net trade credit to sales ratio 3 has kept rising, especially among small and medium firms. Trade debt is a key component of firms' liabilities: though the lifting of credit ceiling in 1983 has marked the beginning of a steady increase in loan supply, in 1993 trade debt was, except fora few cases, larger than short term bank debt (Table 3) .
These stylized facts, that seem largely cycle-insensitive, clearly warrant an explanation, because they are hard to explain as driven by changes in the payment practices, as a transactionsbased approach would suggest; furthermore, the progressive stretching of the terms of trade financing increases, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of liquidity shocks, the more so among bankdependent small firms.
What do we know about the institutional features of trade credit in Italy? Not very much, except for anedoctal evidence. Various sources agree on detecting very informai arrangements, rarely enforced by law. As an example, discounts are not usually granted nor interest rates penalties are imposed because of extra delays in payments, incidentally longer than in near countries. Rules of thumb are thus bound to prevail when creditors can enforce contractual terms only through the very time consuming, and transactionally costly, formai judiciary way. Large firms are able to exploit their market power even indirectly: for instance, they often impose not to factor out their receivables, unless to captive factors . Frasca and Marotta (1989) hinted that the financial recovery of large firms during the 80s could be partly accounted for by the redistribution of net trade credit towards them, thus implying that the effective cost of this resource was, at least for these firms, de facto lower than bank credit.
The following paragraph provides an econometrie investigation in order to assess more formally different behaviors among large and smaller firms.
An econometrie analysis on pane[ data
The econometrie investigation exploits a set of averaged indicators computed from 1982 (for some variables from 1983) to 1993 by the Centrale dei Bilanci for firms classified according to 6 sal es size (as of 1993) classes and to Pavitt's 4 macrosectors -high tech, scale, specialization, and traditional -they belong to (see Data Appendix for more details). The novelty of the data set, despite the shortcoming of non having individuai data, is that in the literature papers on trade credi t using panel data restrict themselves to a subset of finns: large ones (Chiplin-Wright, 1985, and Crawford, 1992 , for UK) or small ones (Chant-Walker, 1988 , for US); also the Elliehausen-Wolken (1993) cross-section study deals with small (with at most 500 employees) US finns.
The estimation strategy of simple reduced fonn regressions for both trade credit and debt as well as for net credit aims at detecting whether large and small finns, having controlled for their idiosyncratic financial structure as well as for their own selling and buying market institutional settings, react differently to interest rates and to some indicators of their cyclical situation. The basic setup for the trade debt and credit equations for the i-th averaged "finn" acknowledges the role played by transactions and financial detenninants: TD = TD( q,mix; r, in v, P)
TC=TC(q,mix; r ,inv, g ,S),
where:
TC(D) = gross trade credit (debt) stock at constant prices; q= quick (i.e. current assets net of inventories to current liabilities) ratio; mix = share of short tenn bank debt to the sum of short term bank and trade debt; r = bank loan economy-wide rate of interest or implicit own borrowing cost; inv = inverse of inventory tumover (inventories/sales); P= purchases at constant prices; g = sales annual rate of change; S = sales at constant prices.
Whereas the sign suggested by the transactions approach for the scaling variables, purchases and sales, respectively, is definitely positive, no such clues are offered on theoretical grounds for most other determinants. Taking into account the Italian institutional setting, though, the signs attached can be rationalized as follows. The two financial structure control variables are expected to be positive signed, given their signaling role for extemal lenders: a more liquid finn is better at offering/obtaining payment delays 4 ; a larger share of bank loans to total short tenn liabilities (remember that in Italy the commerciai paper is as yet missing), that mirrors finn's creditworthiness, a) enhances the ability to get payment postponements from suppliers and b)
enables the extension of payment delays to buyers, because of the shield to liquidity shocks provided by the access to bank lending. The expected signs for the other variables are instead a priori ambiguous, especially when large/small finn considerations are taken into account, and deserve to be discussed separately for trade debt and credi t.
Gross trade debt. Changes in the market interest rates lead to a substitution out of bank debt, if the relative stickiness of the implicit cost of trade debt, due to its slowly changing institutional detenninants, implies corresponding changes in the rate differential. A lower inventory tumover, if interpreted as an indicator of financial distress, can reduce the (possibly smaller) finn's ability to get forbearance on payment delays from its suppliers; an opposi te effect can work if finns shift to their suppliers the costs of unintended inventory accumulation.
Gross trade credit. The substitution effect of higher market interest rates leading to lower borrowing from banks and hence to shorter payment delays granted to buyers could be reversed by an anticyclical use of trade credit as a marketing device in order to offset the deflationary consequences on sal es. This is actually one instance of possible divergent policies followed by large and small finns: whereas the fonner could try to implement, possibly because not financially constrained, a sal es smoothing policy, the latter could instead, because of the cash flow enhancing effects of higher sales, prefer to further bolster demand through larger payment delays to buyers. A lower inventory tumover could finally be signed negatively if, following an integrated current assets management, the implied heavier financial charges are offset by cuts in trade credi t, or positively, should the perspectives of demand elasticity to lower effective prices suggest instead a trade credit extension.
The basic setup for the i-th finn's gross trade debt and credit is specified for the econometrie investigation in a log-linear fonn; in order to let the financial and cyclical variables to affect the economies of scale parameter, they enter interacted with the scaling variable 5
• Furthennore, in order to detect differences in the behaviors of large and small finns, the coefficients of the interacted variables are allowed to vary with finn's size, with a sales cutoff set at 50 billion lire in the final year 1993 6 ; finally, in order to account for sector specific payment practices and other structural factors, the estimated specification allows for direct elasticities to the scaling variables varying with the macrosector the i-th averaged finn belongs to.
Estimation issues. The chosen fixed (individuai and time ), instead of the random, effects OLS estimation procedure is motivated by the likely correlation of intercepts tenns, picking up time invariant individuai characteristics, with the regressors. Due to the short term nature of trade credit, a lagged dependent variable specification with annual data was excluded a priori (though statistically checked ex post). In fact, allowing for fixed individuai effects should adequately capture inertial components, due to the institutional specific context, contrary to Chiplin-Wright (1985) justification for a lagged dependent specification. Being the variables included in the regressions computed averaging individuai data within the 24 cross-section cells, the scope for simultaneity bias is likely to be reduced Estimation results: trade debt. Having controlled for the financial structure -both indicators are positively signed as expected -the substitution effect, between bank and trade debt, attached to the interest rate, empirically pro xi ed by the own specific cost of borro w ed funds, is well determined across all firms. The sign conflict for the inventories to sales ratio appears to fit the different financial constraints faced by firms according to their size: the coefficient is negative and much larger in absolute terms for small firms, hinting at the difficulties they experience to obtain payment delays when such an indicator of financial distress worsens (Table 4 ). Measured at the average values of the interacting variables, the elasticity coefficient of trade debt to purchases is sizably different between large and small firms (.91 vs .. 61). The result hardly fits the assumption of a cost hierarchy with trade debt on top among the short term liabilities, unless large firms are rather implausibly less skilled than smaller ones in financial management.
Estimation results: gross trade credit. Overall, the estimates support the claim of significant differences between large and smaller firms: except for the financial structure indicators that show up positively signed, the other three interacting variables are differently signed, with coefficients larger in absolute terms for small firms. As for the interest rate, the average economy-wide variable turns out to be empirically preferable to the own implicit borrowing cost, though barely significant for large firms (Table 5 ). The pattem of signs attached to the sales rate of change (+/-), the inventories to sales ratio (+/-) and the interest rate(-/+), respectively for the small/large firms, fits a picture where small firms behave as being financially constrained and hence cycle-sensitive; large firms, unsurprisingly, look much better at smoothing the sales profile and at following an integrated management of their current assets. [(TC-TD)/S]it =ao +(13o + L~= 1 13ojkj)sit +(13, + L~= 1 13,iki)Pit +(13z +l33d)rit +(134 +13sd)mixit + +(136 +l37d)qi,t-l +(13s +13gd)git +uit; uit =Yi +YJt +Eit; !:it =w.n.
Overall, the estimates tum out pretty precisely determined ( Focusing on the interest rate as an indicator ofthe monetary policy stance, as well as on the sales rate of change, whereas their coefficients for large finns are negligible, they are fairly precisely detennined and negatively signed for small finns. The bottom line of the econometrie exercise is thus that in the Italian case there is no empirica! support for the Meltzer hypothesis:
small bank-dependent finns are not shielded from a monetary squeeze through a redistribution towards them of net trade credi t.
5.
Concluding remarks
The often neglected (due mainly to data problems) trade credi t is under renewed scrutiny because some key implications of the credit view on the efficacy of a restrictive monetary policy hinge on the differential behavior of large and small finns, the latter being more likely to be rationed in the bank loan market. The assumption, taken for granted in the US-based literature, of a cost hierarchy between trade debt and bank lending, derives from d/D n/N contractual features that are however unknown to most other industrialized countries. Furthennore, in order to assess the relevance of the credit view implication that a monetary restrictive policy can be weakened by the reallocation of net trade credit from large finns, able to access to market funds, to small finns, an empirica! investigation of both trade credit and debt is called for.
The paper provides an extensive analysis of trade credit and debt in a country, Italy, that provides an ideai setting for the working of the credit view because of its bank-centered financial structure, of the incidence, among the highest in an intemational comparison, of trade debt in finn balance sheets, and of an industriai structure tilted towards small finns. The econometrie investigation takes advantage of an averaged panel that, rather unusually in the literature, includes the whole gamut of finn sizes.
lO
The main results of the paper can be summarised as foliows. First, large and smali (according to whether 1993 sales are above o below the 50 billion lire cutoff) firms do show significant differences as to the sign of the determinants of their trade credit and debt, suggesting that smaller firms behave as being financially constrained and hence cycle-sensitive, whereas large ones smooth the sales profile and adopt an integrated management of inventories and receivables.
Second, trade debt, in an institutional context where formalized contracts are not widespread ancl/or rarely enforceable, does not compare so unfavorably to bank lending, as suggested by an elasticity to purchases a one third higher for large firms compared to small ones. Third, a preliminary assessment ofthe combined effect on net trade credit ofthe interest rate, taken as an indicator ofthe monetary policy stance, and of the sales rate of change, shows that in the Italian case there is no empirica! support for the Meltzer hypothesis: small financially constrained firms are not shielded from a monetary squeeze through a redistribution towards them of net trade credit, thus casting some reservations on the working of the standard credit view of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Data Appendix
The Trade credit includes short and long term receivables; trade debt includes short and long term payables, net of debt to plant suppliers and of customers' advances. Ali variables at current prices are deflated with the GDP deflator. Centrale dei Bilanci (1995) is the source for ali the variables included in the regressions except for the economy-wide average interest rate i, included among the regressors in Table 5 , and for the GDP deflator, both provided in the Bank of Italy's Annua! Report. Source: see Table 2 .
Table4
Trade debt panel regressions LHS variable: t(rade)d(ebt), 1983 LHS variable: t(rade)d(ebt), -1993 individuai tdit = end-year trade debt at 1985 prices (logs) of the i-th averaged "firm" (i =l, ... , 24) with 1993 sal es included in the intervals, in billion lire, 1-5, 5-10, 10-25,25-50, 50-100 and at least 100 for each ofthe 4 Pavitt's macrosector P .. k = purchases at 1985 prices (logs); k= l: high tech sector; k=2 : specialization sector; k=3 : traditional sector ru = i-th finn own implicit borrowing cost computed as fmancial charges/ average fmancialliabilities mix;,~_ 1 = end-year short term bank debt to short term bank and trade debt ratio qu_ 1 = end-year quick (current assets net ofinventories to current liabilities) ratio invu = inventories to sales ratio at year t d= binary variable equa! to l for fmns with sales below 50 bn lire and zero otherwise DW = Durbin Watson statistic for generai misspecification Hausman statisti c = tests for the null hypothesis of random against the alternative of fixed effects mode l * significant at the l 0% leve l; * * significant at the 5% leve l; * * * significant at the l% leve!. See Data Appendix for further details. : -e-1 00-500 bn -+->500 bn
